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Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing to
the Ag Decision Maker Hand-
book, the following updates are
included.
Historic Cash Corn and
Soybean Prices—File A2-11
(2 pages)
2002 Iowa Farm Custom
Rate Survey—File A3-10 (4
pages)
Historic Hog and Lamb
Prices—File B2-10 (2 pages)
Historic Cattle Prices—
File B2-12 (2 pages)
Please add these files to your
handbook and remove the out-
of-date material.
Romance vs. reality: Hard lessons learned in grass-fed
beef marketing cooperative—Part one
by Annie Wilson, member and former business manager, Tallgrass Prairie Producers Co-op,
Rural Papers Newsletter, Kansas Rural Center, October 2001
Editor’s Note: Tallgrass Prairie Producers Co-op operated from 1995 to
2000, raising and marketing grass-fed beef from ten Kansas ranches. It
ceased active operation in 2000. Below is the story of why and how.
While the cluster continues to explore ways to work together, former
business manager Annie Wilson offers the following as their lessons
learned in the hopes that others will benefit from what they’ve learned.
The purpose of this article is not to discourage other producersfrom niche marketing, but to share our experiences in our fiveyears of marketing grass-fed beef. The variables in any business
effort are so endless that we cannot conclusively pronounce what will or
won’t work for others. Times change and undoubtedly some of the
production and marketing reali-
ties we faced are different now. A
new and different formula may
work today. We only know what
happened to us, and will try to
communicate our perspective
here.
First we will give a general
overview of our history, followed
by what we see as the critical
elements of success, (some of
which we unfortunately lacked).
Business history
Tallgrass Beef is a product pro-
duced by ten ranch families in a
marketing cooperative called
Tallgrass Prairie Producers Co-op.
Our original mission was “to
produce and market meat prod-
ucts from livestock raised in a way
to maximize conservation of
natural resources and minimize
use of fossil fuels and farm chemi-
cals.” We decided to raise cattle
that spent their entire lives on the
pasture, never in the feedlot,
avoiding the grain and feedlot
production model and producing a
unique lean, grass-fed beef prod-
uct raised without hormones or
sub-therapeutic antibiotics.
To do this, we organized ourselves
into a formal marketing coopera-
tive in 1995 to develop our prod-
uct, market, and distribution
strategies. We received some
grant assistance. But all our
operating capital was generated
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Romance vs. reality: Hard lessons learned in grass-fed beef marketing cooperative, continued from page 1
from investment in co-op stock by the ten ranch
families.
The organizational structure was member-based,
with someone from each ranch serving either indi-
vidually or as husband-wife teams on our Board of
Directors which met monthly. All ranches also had to
serve on either our Marketing or Production Com-
mittees which also met monthly, and our officers had
an additional monthly meeting as our Executive
Committee.
We had one non-member employee who provided
part-time marketing and operations management
services; and one member who served as business
manager, taking orders, doing billing, handling
communications; and another member who worked
part-time at our storage unit assembling large orders
for out-of-state shipment. All other jobs were per-
formed by co-op members on a volunteer basis.
Early on we did nutritional testing on our grass-fed
beef, discovering that it had an extraordinary nutri-
tional profile, even better than we had thought, with
a very low fat content and high nutrient content. We
went through the onerous process of obtaining USDA
approval for Nutrition Facts labels for all our prod-
ucts, as well as unique special label claims including
natural, free range, grassfed, (to our knowledge, the
first beef product in the nation to obtain this desig-
nation), raised without hormones, etc. We main-
tained intricate documentation on every animal
processed, and recorded carcass data for all beef
processed. (The advantages of CLA and Omega-3
fatty acids were an area we had only begun to
explore toward the end of our production.)
Market successes
One of our great market successes was the effective-
ness with which our members could personally
market our beef. We attended promotions and trade
shows in which our passionate, western-clad ranch-
ers were popular attractions and generated great
consumer enthusiasm. People loved to meet and visit
with the actual producers. The only problem was this
was time-consuming and expensive.
At first we assembled our own promotional material,
but later hired professional graphic designers who
produced award-winning labels and promotional
materials. We were fortunate to receive attention
from local and national media, and won Best of Show
awards in our state food exhibition. It is our strong
opinion that we had one of the most healthy, deli-
cious and environmentally sustainable food products
ever offered to the American consumer.
At our peak, we were marketing our beef in 23 states
through three large natural food distributors. From
the beginning, we also direct marketed some beef in
our local area. However, our local markets were so
low in volume and high cost in service that they were
never profitable. The markets that worked best
economically were the large distributor markets.
Catch-22 or barriers
Barriers we encountered were numerous. Many we
were able to overcome through hard work and
determination. Others had become insurmountable
by the time we perceived them clearly, and we found
ourselves caught in a vicious cycle.
Our volume was too low to obtain processing of our
product at an economically viable, competitive rate
(our costs were triple those of other high volume
suppliers). Yet even managing the volume of orders
we had was exhausting our members and employees.
We lacked adequate supply to access the markets we
needed to reach the volume we needed to obtain
affordable processing and transportation. Addition-
ally, we did not have the capital to acquire profes-
sional management to guide our company in these
directions.
Despite painstaking monthly analysis of our gross
margin and exploring every cost-cutting measure we
could think of, including heroic subsidization of our
business with free labor from our members, we were
consistently losing equity. We could not see any
improvement in sight within the economic structure
in which we were trapped. At that point, we used our
now considerable experience to produce a thorough
business plan.
Using this plan, we looked for outside help including
private investors, financial institutions, government
agencies, foundations, and other rancher alliances.
However, we could not find the help we needed.
Ultimately, we lacked the capital to escape our
quandary. Our members, who had already made
significant financial investments in the co-op, faced
the prospect of mortgaging their family ranches to
back what we knew was a worthy but risky enter-
prise, to compete in a cut-throat and volatile com-
mercial arena.
In 2000, after five years of intense struggle, we made
the painful decision to terminate our sales and stem
our loss of equity, so that we would be able to pay all
of our co-op’s bills and would not cause financial
injury to others. In hindsight, we realize that we
should have initially leveraged our investments and
borrowed heavily from a financial institution, based
on a sound business plan developed by professionals
continued on page 3
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that would have established a larger, viable scale,
professionally managed operation.
Instead we tried to avoid co-op debt and do it all
ourselves, learning as we went. In retrospect, we also
learned that even larger specialty meat companies
we had thought were very successful also are strug-
gling. The phenomena of concentration both within
the processing industry and retail arena is so intense
that the profit margins are slim for everyone. There
are fewer and fewer processors available for mid-size
companies. The expense and burden of service and
promotion are almost entirely passed on to the
supplier by retailers. We wonder now if it would even
be possible to survive as a “mid-size” company, with
volume of around 30,000 head a year, which was
what we were considering as our expansion level
goal, an astronomical increase from our peak of 400
head a year.
Our co-op is made up of committed, active members.
We feel the co-op model is an excellent one, except a
professional manager should run the business and
not the Board of Directors. We attribute our remark-
able level of progress on so little capital and without
professional guidance to the sheer commitment of our
member families.
As we see it
The fundamentals of success profitability depends on
three elements:
• Professional management of operations and
marketing to establish and manage legal, safe
operations, to penetrate the market and to
navigate the complex food distribution system.
This is essential for the business to succeed and
to allow producers the time to do what they
know how to do, which is to produce high
quality products.
• A successful business needs access to volume
markets to reach breakeven (when gross profit
on sales exceeds overheads). A business may be
able to break the paradigm of huge scale
production and survive on lower volume, but in
so doing it must practice honest accounting for
personal time and must reach a volume that
covers these overheads.
• Cost-effective operations are necessary to
realistically price the product and reach the
volume needed to be profitable.
The two keys to acquiring the above three elements
are a critical mass of supply and capital.
Supply
• An adequate supply is critical to access cost-
efficient processing. The smaller the volume,
the more expensive the processing. Only high
volume, highly-efficient processing operations
can turn commodity into a safe product and
keep direct costs within reason. Unless a
business can offer a significant supply on a
regular basis, these operations will not bother
with it.
• The ability to access volume markets depends
on an adequate supply. Buyers won’t even talk
to a business unless it can consistently deliver
a quality product with no interruptions in
supply.
• On a related note: adequate supply is a
prerequisite to offering fresh product, which
has significant market advantages over frozen
beef. We found consumers really wanted fresh
beef, and that frozen product severely limited
our marketability, except in very low volume,
tiny outlets. But since a fresh product has such
a short shelf life, it requires a steady,
consistent volume of product turnover.
Capital
• Adequate capital is necessary to acquire
expertise and information to develop a feasible
business plan, to acquire competent
management to run the business, and to cash
flow the operation. The basic formula summary
for economic sustainability: supply + capital =
Lower-cost processing + volume markets +
professional management.
Next month—further lessons learned by Tallgrass
Prairie Producers Coop.
Romance vs. reality: Hard lessons learned in grass-fed beef marketing cooperative, continued from page 2
4 February 2002
The proposed regulations for the incomeaveraging provisions for farmers were madefinal on January 7, 2002. The final regulations
addressed several of the shortcomings in the pro-
posed regulations issued in 1999.
Farm landlords
The proposed regulations did not address the ques-
tion of whether farm landlords were eligible for
income averaging. However, the final regulations
provide that rental income that is based on a
tenant’s production (a share rent lease) is treated as
income from a farming business if, after December
31, 2002, the landlord’s share of a tenant’s produc-
tion is set in a written rental agreement entered into
before the tenant begins significant activities.
The final regulations make it clear that a landlord is
not considered to be engaged in a farming business if
the rental is either a fixed rent (cash rent) or, for
amounts received on or after January 1, 2003, even
share rents based on a share of a tenant’s production
determined under an unwritten agreement or a
written agreement entered into after the tenant has
begun significant activities on the land. Surprisingly,
the final regulations specify that whether the land-
lord materially participates in the tenant’s farming
business “is irrelevant for purposes of section 1301.”
Therefore, non-materially participating filers under
Form 4835 or even filers on Schedule E are eligible
for income averaging if the landlord’s share of a
tenant’s production is set in a written rental agree-
ment before the tenant begins significant activities
on the land.
This places a premium on assuring that leases are in
writing.
Eligibility of wages
The proposed regulations stated that, in general,
income items passed through to partners or other
owners in a pass-through entity, were eligible for
income averaging. For S corporations, the charac-
ter of income from corporate distributions contin-
ues in the hands of the shareholders who are
eligible to average their incomes. However, under
the proposed regulations, farm income did not
include “wages.”
The final regulations state specifically that “a
shareholder of an S corporation engaged in a
farming business” may treat compensation re-
ceived from the corporation that is attributable to
the farming business as farm income.
The summary to T.D. 8972 (but not the final regula-
tions themselves) states that the income attribut-
able to a farming business carried on by a partner-
ship can be averaged without regard to the
partner’s level of participation in the partnership
or the size of the ownership interest.
Negative taxable income
The final regulations embrace the change in
position first announced in the 2001 Farmers Tax
Guide and in the Schedule J instructions allowing a
base year’s taxable income to be negative. However,
amounts such as a net operating loss or capital loss
that may be deducted in one or more other taxable
years in the form of a carryback or carryforward
must be added back in computing negative taxable
income.
Change in filing status
As did the proposed regulations, the final regula-
tions state that an individual is not prohibited from
making an income averaging election solely be-
cause the individual’s filing status is not the same
as in the base years. However, the final regulations
do not provide guidance on how the remaining
bracket amounts are to be divided between the
spouses if both spouses have elected farm income in
a year following marriage dissolution, which was a
shortcoming of the proposed regulations.
Amending returns
Under the proposed regulations, an individual
could not make a late election, change an election
or revoke an election unless there had been an
adjustment to taxable income or tax liability or the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue had consented.
That requirement has been eliminated in the final
regulations with the provision now stating simply
that an election can be made on a “late or amended
return if the period of limitations on filing a claim
for credit or refund has not expired....” and that a
previous election can be changed or revoked if the
period of limitations has not expired.
Effective dates
In general, the final regulations are effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2001.
However, the requirement for a written lease
agreement does not apply until after December 31,
2002.
Final regulations on income averaging for farmers*
by Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Professor in Agriculture, professor of economics,
515-294-6354, harl@iastate.edu
* Reprinted with permission from the February 15,
2002 issue of Agricultural Law Digest, agricultural
law press publication. Footnotes not included.
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The 2001 corn stocks-to–use-ratio for theUnited States is projected to be 0.159, thetwelfth lowest in the last forty years (for the
world less China it is projected to be 0.129, also the
twelfth lowest level). If China is included—
China’s stock levels are as usual, uncertain and
unverified—then the stocks-to-use ratio is 0.206,
the fourteenth lowest level in the last forty
years.
With stocks at those levels why are prices at record
lows? From the U.S. perspective, there are two
reasons. The first is that in many of the past years
government or Farmer-Owned-Reserve stocks—
although isolated from the market for a range of
prices—were available and made the stock-to-use
ratio larger for a given level of price. The other
reason market prices tend to be low even though
stocks are low is that the market knows there are
no farm program instruments that will kick in
now, or next crop year, to raise prices. Market
participants would bid up prices if they anticipated
additions to government stocks or the Farmer
Owned Reserve this year or if acreage reduction
programs were likely to be instituted next crop
year. Since none of these actions are possible under
current legislation, buyers have every reason to
believe that prices will be just a low or lower next
crop year. And with continued good weather
providing trend level or better increases in yield,
crop prices will indeed remain low.
But low prices are not the only thing that farmers
and the nation have to be on the lookout for. In
some ways, we have the worst of all possible
worlds. Prices remain low, although stocks are
relatively small compared to the past. However, if a
yield catastrophe hits, there are no stocks to buffer
prices and to provide assurance to exporters and
domestic demanders that the U.S. is a dependable
supplier of grain. With stocks at the present
relatively low levels, what would happen if we had
a drop in corn yield similar to the ones we experi-
enced in 1993 or 1988 or 1983? What would happen
Are we courting disaster?
by Daryll E. Ray, Blasingame Chair of Excellence in Agricultural Policy, Institute of
Agriculture, University of Tennessee, and director, UT Agricultural Policy Analysis
Center, 865-974-7407; dray@utk.edu; http://www.agpolicy.org.
to our projected 2001 corn carryover levels of 1.57
billion bushels, if we had two poor crops in a row?
If we had a 23–29 percent drop in yields like we saw
in 1983, 1988, and 1993 along with the concomitant
increase in the abandonment of planted acres, we
could see the current modest carryover levels drop
significantly and prices rise to unprecedented
levels. It is not inconceivable that producers could
see a lot of $5 corn with peaks as high as $10. The
other crops would be affected as well resulting in
some utilization changes being made due to the
shortage of “cheap” corn. Again it is not inconceiv-
able that we might see $10 beans with higher peaks.
While prices like that would be good for those who
have something to sell, the repercussions would be
dramatic. Some of our steady export customers
would have to develop contacts elsewhere in the
world. Like Charlie who got on the Kingston’s Trio’s
MTA, one has to wonder “if they would ever return.”
Some of our largest hog and poultry conglomerates
would likely become significant importers of grain
and soybean meal—a practice they might become
comfortable with. For those who have both grain
and livestock, what they gained in the grain prices
would be lost on the livestock side of the operation.
Besides not satisfying the needs of traditional
demanders, the high prices would cause countries
around the world to further step-up major-crop
production. It is one thing to talk about raising loan
rates $0.20, it is quite another to have $4, $5, or $6
corn. And, we know that when new acreage is
brought into production, the increase tends to be
relatively permanent.
All of this brings us back to a point we have made
before. Properly administered, an emergency food
reserve could be of vital importance to producers
and consumers in the US and around the world.
While short-term high prices might feel good,
everyone may benefit more in the long run with a
more stable food supply system that can accommo-
date significant weather-related production problems.
Handling gains and losses on cooperative stock *
by Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Professor in Agriculture, professor of economics,
515-294-6354, harl@iastate.edu
The reporting of gains and losses on the stock ofcooperatives has been a pressing issue in manyfarm communities as value-added cooperatives * Reprinted with permission from the January 4, 2002issues of Agricultural Law Digest, agricultural lawpress publications.  Footnotes not included.
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. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
materials can be made available in alternative formats for ADA
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machine or other copy technology, so long as the
source (Ag Decision Maker Iowa State University
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May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Stanley R. Johnson, director,
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of
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and other cooperatives have failed or merged with
cancellation of patronage equities.  In many instances,
the question is the proper characterization of the
equity interest relinquished by the patron and
whether losses are ordinary losses or capital losses.
Rev. Rul. 70-64
A 1970 revenue ruling, Rev. Rul. 70-64, has provided
helpful guidance for situations similar factually to the
facts in the ruling.  In that ruling, a taxpayer operat-
ing a chicken farm became a member of an agricul-
tural cooperative for purposes of acquiring supplies
and marketing eggs and chickens.  The cooperative
followed the practice of retaining patronage dividends
to augment capital with qualified written notices of
allocation.  The cooperative normally redeemed the
qualified notices of allocation, usually within one to
two years.  In the year in question, the cooperative
redeemed the qualified written notices of allocation
but at less than their stated amount on issuance.
Thus, the taxpayer incurred a loss when the allocation
was redeemed.  The question was the nature of the
loss—whether an ordinary loss or a capital loss.
The ruling states that—
“…the taxpayer joined the cooperative to facilitate
his business and to make it more profitable.  The
transaction that gave rise to the issuance of the
notice of allocation arose in the ordinary course of
taxpayer’s trade or business.  Accordingly, the
loss incurred by the taxpayer upon redemption of
the qualified written notice of allocation is an
ordinary loss deductible…under the provisions of
section 165 of the Code.”
The loss was measured by the difference between the
stated amount included in income in the earlier year
and the amount received upon redemption.
It is noted that the loss did not involve an equity
investment by the patron in the cooperative; rather,
the loss involved the failure to receive the benefit of
amounts reported into income in the earlier year.
Investment in cooperatives
The more difficult question is the proper treatment of
gains and losses for equity interests in a cooperative
which were purchased or otherwise acquired in a
transaction that did not involve allocated patronage
earnings.
It is important to note that all assets are considered to
be capital assets other than for specified exceptions.
The exceptions are for:
1. inventory property,
2. property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or
business,
3. depreciable property used in the trade or
business,
4. real property used in the trade or business,
5. copyrights and compositions, and
6. U.S. Government publications.
Stock in a cooperative does not seem to fall within any
of the exceptions.  [Cf. Peake v. Comm’r, 10 TCM 577
(1951) (taxpayer’s interest in a cooperative apartment
venture consisted of stock in a cooperative apartment
corporation rather than of a proprietary lease and
deduction for loss in year investment became worth-
less was long-term capital loss).]  Therefore, it would
appear that an investment in stock of a cooperative,
including a value-added cooperative, would be a
capital asset with a loss properly characterized as a
capital loss.
Cooperative part of “trade or business”?
A further question is whether an equity interest in a
cooperative could be classified as a “Section 1231
asset” which would permit net losses to be treated as
ordinary losses.  Some have argued that, since mem-
bership in some cooperatives requires members to be
producing a particular product (e.g., corn or sugar
beets), membership in the cooperative could be deemed
a part of the trade or business.
The problem with that argument is that the definition
of “property used in the trade or business” for purposes
of Section 1231 capital gain (or ordinary loss) treat-
ment is relatively narrow—
“The term ‘property used in the trade or business’
means property used in the trade or business, of a
character which is subject to the allowance of
depreciation provided in section 167, held for
more than 1 year, and real property used in the
trade or business, held for more than 1 year….”
Obviously, cooperative stock or other equity instru-
ments in a cooperative are neither depreciable prop-
erty nor real property used in the trade or business.
In conclusion
Losses attributable to allocated patronage, which has
been reported into income appear to be deductible as
ordinary trade or business losses.  However, losses
from investments in cooperative equities would seem
to be properly characterized as capital losses.
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